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Anthony Duggan*

Quinquagenaries

This article is part of a symposium to mark the 50th anniversary, or quinquagenary,
of the Dalhousie Law Journal. The invitation to participate in the symposium asked
authors to reflect on developments in their field over the past 50 years. My field
is the law of secured transactions and, as it happens, the Canadian Personal
Property Security Acts (PPSAs) are approaching their own quinquagenary. There
have been numerous statutory and case law developments over the past 50 years,
but one of the most remarkable turn of events is the influence the Canadian PPSAs
have had on the reform of secured transactions laws in other countries, including
New Zealand and Australia. Australia and New Zealand have already built up a
substantial body of PPSA case law and literature which in part tracks Canadian
learning, but in part also deals with issues that have not been as much discussed
in Canada. One issue that has received a good deal of attention, particularly in
Australia, is the PPSA’s application to true lease agreements. In contrast to Article
9 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, the Canadian PPSAs apply not
only to security (finance) leases, but also to true leases that are for a term of more
than one year. The Australian and New Zealand PPSAs take more or less the
same approach. The purpose, in part, is to avoid litigation on the true lease-finance
lease distinction in determining the application of the statute. This article, drawing
on Canadian, Australian and New Zealand learning, aims to show that the need
for drawing the distinction persists to a greater extent than is commonly supposed.
Cet article fait partie d’un symposium organisé pour marquer le 50e anniversaire
du Dalhousie Law Journal. Dans l’invitation à participer au symposium, il était
demandé aux auteurs de réfléchir aux développements survenus dans leur
domaine au cours des 50 dernières années. Mon domaine est le droit des
transactions garanties et, comme par hasard, les lois canadiennes sur les sûretés
mobilières (LSM) approchent de leur propre quinquennat. Il y a eu de nombreux
développements législatifs et jurisprudentiels au cours des 50 dernières années,
mais l’une des tournures d’événements les plus remarquables est l’influence que
les LSM canadiennes ont eue sur la réforme des lois sur les transactions garanties
dans d’autres pays, notamment en Nouvelle-Zélande et en Australie. Ces deux
pays ont déjà constitué un corpus substantiel de jurisprudence et de littérature
sur les LSM qui suit en partie l’apprentissage canadien, mais qui traite aussi de
questions qui n’ont pas été autant discutées au Canada. Une question qui a reçu
beaucoup d’attention, particulièrement en Australie, est l’application de la LSM
aux véritables contrats de location. Contrairement à l’article 9 du United States
Uniform Commercial Code, les LSM canadiennes s’appliquent non seulement aux
baux adossés à des sûretés (financement), mais aussi aux baux véritables d’une
durée de plus d’un an. Les LSM de l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande adoptent
plus ou moins la même approche. L’objectif, en partie, est d’éviter les litiges relatifs
à la distinction entre le bail véritable et le bail financier pour déterminer l’application
de la loi. Le présent article, qui s’appuie sur les enseignements du Canada, de
l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, vise à montrer que la nécessité d’établir cette
distinction persiste dans une plus large mesure qu’on ne le croit généralement.
*
Honourable Frank H Iacobucci Chair Emeritus and Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto.
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Introduction
This article is part of a symposium to mark the 50th anniversary, or
quinquagenary, of the Dalhousie Law Journal. The invitation to participate
in the symposium asked authors to reflect on developments in their field
over the past 50 years. My field is the law of secured transactions and,
as it happens, the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs)
are approaching their own quinquagenary.1 There have been numerous
statutory and case law developments over the past 50 years,2 but one of the
most remarkable turn of events is the influence the Canadian PPSAs have
had on the reform of secured transactions laws in other countries. The trend
started in 1999, when New Zealand enacted a statute based almost word
for word on the Saskatchewan PPSA.3 Australia followed suit in 2012,4
1.
Measured by the date of the first Canadian PPSA which was enacted in Ontario in 1967 and came
fully into force in 1976: Personal Property Security Act, SO 1967, c 73. The 1967 Act was replaced
by the Personal Property Security Act 1989 (SO 1989, c 16, now RSO 1990, c P.10) [OPPSA], which
is the current version. The other provinces and territories progressively enacted their own PPSAs in
the period between 1988–2002. The non-Ontario PPSAs are substantially uniform. The Ontario PPSA
remains outside the uniform scheme, but it is conceptually the same as the other PPSAs and, like them,
it owes its origins to Article 9 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code. For a fuller account, see
Jacob S Ziegel, David L Denomme & Anthony Duggan, The Ontario Personal Property Security Act:
Commentary and Analysis, 3rd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2020) at 1-13; Ronald CC Cuming,
Catherine Walsh & Roderick J Wood, Personal Property Security Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2012) at 1-6.
2.
For a summary, see Ziegel, Denomme & Duggan, supra note 1 at 4-20.
3.
Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (NZ), 1999/126 [New Zealand PPSA]; Personal Property
Security Act 1993, SS 1993, c P-6.2 [Saskatchewan PPSA].
4.
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), [Australia PPSA], in force 30 January 2012. In
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though its version is less faithful to the Saskatchewan model, containing
as it does numerous homegrown features, along with measures borrowed
from other sources, including Revised Article 9 of the United States
Uniform Commercial Code and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Secured Transactions.5 Other countries to have adopted the Saskatchewan
model include Brunei (2016), Jamaica (2013) and Malawi (2013), along
with a number of Pacific Island nations, including Fiji (2017), Papua
Niugini (2011) and Vanuatu (2008).6
Australia and New Zealand have already built up a substantial body
of PPSA case law and literature which in part tracks Canadian learning,
but in part also deals with issues that have not been as much discussed in
Canada. One issue that has received a good deal of attention, particularly
in Australia, is the PPSA’s application to true lease agreements. As
originally drafted, the Ontario PPSA applied to a lease of goods, but
only if the transaction in substance secured payment or performance of
an obligation (in other words, the statute applied if the transaction was a
finance lease, but not if it was a true lease). The true lease-finance lease
distinction gave rise to a good deal of litigation in Ontario and in 2006 the
statute was amended so that, in common with the other provinces, it now
applies to both types of lease provided the term is more than one year.
The Australian and New Zealand PPSAs also take this approach. There
has been a fair amount written about the PPSA lease provisions, but the
purpose of this article is to explore some wider implications which have
not previously been identified.7
It is probably true to say that the PPSA has been Canada’s single
most successful commercial law export and that Canada’s international
standing in the commercial law field has been significantly enhanced as
a result. My aim in this article is to celebrate this achievement, while at
contrast to Article 9 and the Canadian PPSAs, the Australian PPSA is a federal statute, the states
having ceded powers to the Commonwealth to allow for its enactment.
5.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legislative Guide on
Secured Transactions, United Nations, New York, 2010, Ch X, available at <uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/payments/Guide_securedtrans.html> [perma.cc/3K4U-Y333].
6.
For a fuller account, see Roderick J Wood,“ “Identifying Borrowed Sources in Secured
Transactions Law Reform” (2019) 24 Un L Rev 545. Organisations such as the Asia Development
Bank (ADB) and the World Bank have been instrumental in some of these developments.
7.
See e.g. Ronald CC Cuming, “True Leases and Security Leases under the Canadian Personal
Property Security Acts” (1983) 7 Can Bus LJ251; Michael Bridge et al, “Formalism, Functionalism
and Understanding the Law of Secured Transactions” (1999) 44 McGill LJ 567 at 598-605; Michael E
Burke, “Ontario Personal Property Security Act Reform: Significant Policy Changes” (2009) 48 Can
Bus LJ 289 at 290-304; Catherine Walsh, “‘Functional Formalism’ in the Treatment of Leases under
Secured Transactions Law: Comparative Lessons from the Canadian Experience” in Spiros Bazinas
& Orkun Akseli, International and Comparative Secured Transactions Law: Essays in Honour of
Roderick Macdonald (Oxford: Hart, 2017) at 25.
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the same time marking the aforementioned quinquagenaries, by exploring
the Australian and New Zealand contributions to thinking about the
PPSAs in their application to leases. An obvious benefit of international
harmonisation is the opportunities it creates for the sharing of ideas and
insights about the law from country to country. Importing countries clearly
benefit in this way when they use another country’s laws as the model for
their own reforms. But the exporting country benefits as well when minds
in the importing countries start turning to the particular issues the model
law raises in their domestic context.
The balance of the article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a
short summary of the true lease-finance lease distinction and the relevant
PPSA provisions. Part II surveys key rulings in Canada, Australia and
New Zealand on the application of the statute to leases. Part III discusses
some implications of the PPSA’s application to leases which have been
identified in Australia and New Zealand, but which have not received the
same attention in Canada to date.
I. True leases and finance leases
The PPSAs apply to every transaction that in substance creates a security
interest, regardless of form.8 A conditional sale agreement (where the seller
supplies goods on credit but reserves title to secure payment) is subject to
the statute because the transaction is in substance the same as if the seller
had transferred title and taken back a security interest. For the purposes
of the statute, the seller is deemed to have transacted on this basis, with
the result that ownership presumptively passes to the buyer and the seller
holds only a security interest. A conditional sale agreement will typically
provide that property in the goods passes when the buyer pays the last
instalment.
As a matter of form, leases are different from sales because, in the
case of a lease, the lessor does not promise to sell the goods and the lessee
does not promise to buy them. But the agreement may give the lessee an
option to purchase the goods at the end of the term. The lessee will have a
strong incentive to exercise the option if, for example the rental payments
in total approximately equal the cash price of the goods (plus interest) and
the option price is a nominal one. A transaction like this is in substance the
same as a conditional sale because although the lessee is not legally obliged
to buy the goods, she is financially committed to doing so. The position
is the same where the term of the lease is for approximately the whole of
8.
See e.g. Personal Property Security Act, SNS 1995–1996, c 13, s 4(2) [Nova Scotia PPSA].
Citations throughout this article will be to the Nova Scotia PPSA as representative of the Canadian
provincial PPSAs outside Ontario, except where the context requires otherwise.
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the useful life of the goods because, by implication, the lessor does not
expect to get the goods back and the rentals will have been calculated
to approximate the cash price. A lease structured along these lines is a
finance lease. A finance lease, like a conditional sale, is a transaction that
in substance creates a security interest and the PPSAs apply on that basis.
As a matter of legal form, the finance lease is indistinguishable
from the true lease. In both cases, the parties are typically referred to
as the lessor and lessee respectively; the lessee is given possession and
use of the goods for a term while the lessor retains ownership; and the
periodic payments due from the lessee are typically referred to as “rent.”
But despite these formal similarities, the two types of transaction serve
different functions. The true lease is a species of bailment under which the
lessee has possession and use of the goods for a limited term; the lessee
acquires no further interest in the goods beyond that; and, as a corollary,
the rental payments are in exchange for possession and use. By contrast,
as explained above, the finance lease is a disguised purchase agreement
where the lessee, in addition to having possession and use of the goods
also has an expectation of ownership; and, correspondingly, the rental
payments are, in effect, instalments of the purchase price. In both cases,
the lessor retains ownership but for different reasons: in the case of a
finance lease, the purpose is to secure the lessee’s payment obligation,
while in the case of a true lease, the lessor remains the owner because the
transaction contemplates only the transfer of possession and enjoyment on
a temporary basis, not ownership.9
Given the formal similarities between the two transactions, in
borderline cases it may be hard for the courts to distinguish between them
and hard for parties to predict in advance which way a court might decide.
The agreement may provide expressly or by implication for an option to
purchase, but this feature alone is not conclusive unless it is all but assured
from the outset that the option will be exercised.10 In DaimlerChrysler
Services Canada Inc v Cameron,11 the British Columbia Court of Appeal
identified the following factors as being relevant to characterising the
transaction:

9.
Cuming, supra note 7 at 263.
10. Cuming, supra note 7 at 272.
11. 2007 BCCA 144 at para 22, citing Cuming, supra note 7 at 285. See also Smith Brothers
Contracting Ltd (Re) (1998), 53 BCLR (3d) 264, 1998 CarswellBC 678; 843504 Alberta Ltd (Re),
2011 ABQB 448; Connacher Oil and Gas Ltd (Re), 2017 ABQB 769.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

whether there was an option to purchase for a nominal sum;
whether there was a provision in the lease granting the lessee an
equity or property interest in the equipment;
whether the nature of the lessor’s business was to act as a financing
agency;
whether the lessee paid a sales tax incident to acquisition of the
equipment;
whether the lessee paid all other taxes incident to ownership of the
equipment;
whether the lessee was responsible for comprehensive insurance on
the equipment;
whether the lessee was required to pay any and all licence fees for
operation of the equipment and to maintain the equipment at his
expense;
whether the agreement placed the entire risk of loss upon the lessee;
whether the agreement included a clause permitting the lessor to
accelerate the payment of rent upon default of the lessee and granted
remedies similar to those of a mortgagee;
whether the equipment subject to the agreement was selected by the
lessee and purchased by the lessor for this specific lease;
whether the lessee was required to pay a substantial security deposit
in order to obtain the equipment;
whether there was a default provision in the lease inordinately
favourable to the lessor;
whether there was a provision in the lease for liquidated damages;
whether there was a provision disclaiming warranties of fitness and/
or merchantability on the part of the lessor; and
whether the aggregate rentals approximate the value or purchase
price of the equipment.

As noted earlier, until 2006, the Ontario PPSA only applied to leases
that in substance created a security interest (finance leases), and this
resulted in a considerable amount of litigation over the characterisation
question.12 By contrast, in the other provinces, the statute was extended
to cover also “a lease for a term of more than one year…that does not
secure payment or performance of an obligation.”13 Ontario moved to this
12. See Jacob S Ziegel & David L Denomme, The Ontario Personal Property Security Act:
Commentary and Analysis, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 57-58.
13. See e.g. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 4(2)(b). “Lease for a term of more than one year” is
defined to include: (1) a lease for an indefinite term; (2) a lease for a term of less than one year where
the lessee, with the lessor’s consent, remains in possession of the goods for more than one year; and
(3) a lease for a term of one year or less if the lease is renewable and it is possible that the original term
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formulation in 2006, with the aim of stemming the flow of litigation.14
The measure does not avoid the issue altogether because, as in the other
provinces, true leases are excluded from the enforcement provisions in
Part V.15 But the underlying assumption (explored further below) is that,
since the issue now arises only in that context, the potential for litigation is
substantially diminished.16 In the other provinces, the main reason for the
measure was to make true leases subject to the PPSA registration system;
true leases give rise to the same ostensible ownership concerns as finance
leases and non-possessory security interests at large, and registration
enables a third party to discover the lessor’s interest in advance of any
dealing with the lessee.17

and the renewed term may together exceed one year. The definition excludes transactions where the
lessor is not regularly engaged in the business of leasing goods and a lease of household furnishings
or appliances as part of a lease of land (ibid, s 2(1)(y)(i)-(iv)).
14. The reform implemented recommendations made by the Canadian Bar Association–Ontario:
Submission to the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations Concerning the Personal Property
Security Act and the Repair and Storage Liens Act (June 1993) at 3-7 and Submission to the Minister
of Consumer and Commercial relations concerning the Personal Property Security Act (October
1998) at 8-11 [CBAO 1998 Submission]. Contrast Article 9 of the United States Uniform Commercial
Code, which does not apply to true leases: UCC § 1-201(35) (2001),“security interest”; see also the
UNCITRAL, Model Law on Secured Transactions (New York: UN, 2016), arts 1, 2(kk), online (pdf):
<https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/19-08779_e_ebook.
pdf> [perma.cc/9FSD-CFRY].
There is a subtle difference between the Ontario and non-Ontario versions of the provision.
The non-Ontario version applies only to a lease that does not secure payment or performance of an
obligation (see e.g. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 4(2)(b)), whereas the Ontario provision applies
“even though the lease may not secure payment or performance of an obligation” (OPPSA, supra note
1 at s 2(c)). The difference is that the non-Ontario version excludes finance leases, whereas the Ontario
version does not. Compare New Zealand PPSA, supra note 3, s 17(1)(b) (referring to a“ “lease for a
term of more than 1 year…whether or not the lease secures payment or performance of an obligation’)
and Australian PPSA, supra note 4, s12(3) (also adopting the “whether or not” formulation). This
difference in wording has been the source of some confusion in Australia: see Anthony Duggan,
Australian Personal Property Securities Law (3rd ed, LexisNexis Australia, Sydney 2021) at paras
13.13 and 13.15 and it is likewise a potential source of confusion when comparing the Ontario and
non-Ontario PPSAs. The temptation is to assume that a“ “lease for a term of more than one year’, as
defined (or “PPS lease” in Australia), is necessarily a true lease but that is not the case in Ontario, New
Zealand and Australia.
15. Ontario PPSA, supra note 1, s 57.1; Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 56. The reason is that the
enforcement provisions presuppose an underlying debt obligation and, by definition, there is no debt
obligation if the transaction is a true lease.
16. In theory, the issue may also arise in relation to leases which are for a term of one year or less, but
in practice a lease with a term this short will nearly always be a true lease unless a below market value
purchase or renewal option is included: see Cuming, supra note 7 at 260-261. The issue may arise if
the lessor is not in the business of leasing but in practice, a one-off finance lease is likely to be rare.
The issue also continues to arise in contexts outside the PPSA, most notably the treatment of leases
in proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA] and Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36: see Burke, supra note 7 at 300-303.
17. See Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 155-156; Cuming, supra note 7 at 258, Burke,
supra note 7 at 299-300.
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II. Key cases
The extension of the PPSAs to true lease agreements means that the
lessor must register a financing statement in order to perfect its “security
interest.” Failure to do so will cause the security interest to be ineffective
in the lessee’s bankruptcy18 and also subordinate to a perfected security
interest in the same collateral, a competing execution creditor and a
transferee of the goods for value without knowledge of the security
interest.19 Conversely, perfection will typically protect the lessor against
these competing interests so that, provided the lessor registers a financing
statement, it will be at least as well protected under the statute against
competing claims as it would have been at general law.20 The key cases
on the application of the statute to lease agreements in Canada, New
Zealand and Australia all arose out of transactions that were entered into
not long after the legislation was introduced and the common feature is
the lessor’s unawareness of the need to register a financing statement. This
problem has diminished over time in all three jurisdictions, with lessors
becoming better informed about the PPSA’s application to their industry
and improving their systems for ensuring compliance. But even though the
litigation arose out of what was largely a transitional problem, the cases
are still important for the light they shed on the conceptual underpinnings
of the statute as it applies to leases.
The leading Canadian case is Re Giffen.21 The dispute concerned
the lease of a motor vehicle in British Columbia. The British Columbia
PPSA came into force on 1 October 1990 and the lease was transacted
on 27 October 1992.22 The lease was for a term of more than one year
and so the statute applied, but the lessor did not register a financing
statement. The lessee subsequently made an assignment in bankruptcy
and the trustee claimed the vehicle, arguing that the lessor’s unperfected
interest was ineffective in the bankruptcy proceedings (British Columbia
PPSA, section 20(b)(i)). The lessor argued that section 20(b)(i) conflicted

18. Except in New Zealand, where failure to perfect does not have insolvency consequences.
19. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, ss 21, 36(1)(b). Section 22 gives the lessor a claim for damages
against the lessee for the value of the goods if its interest is lost to a trustee in bankruptcy or an
execution creditor.
20. At common law, the lessor’s ownership interest would normally prevail over competing claims
on the principle nemo dat quod non habet. The PPSAs replicate these outcomes subject to the lessor’s
compliance with the registration requirement. In particular, the lessor’s interest is a purchase money
security interest, with the result that it has priority over a prior perfected security interest provided the
lessor registers within 15 days after the lessee obtains possession of the goods: Nova Scotia PPSA,
supra note 8, ss 2(1), “purchase money security interest,” 21(1).
21. [1998] 1 SCR 91, 155 DLR (4th) 332.
22. Personal Property Security Act, SBC 1989, c 36.
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with the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act23 and the paramountcy
doctrine applied to render the provision inapplicable. Specifically, it was
claimed, section 20(b)(i) was in operational conflict with the fundamental
bankruptcy principle, enshrined in BIA, section 67, that the trustee in
bankruptcy is entitled only to the “property of the bankrupt”; since, in the
present case, ownership of the vehicle was with the lessor, while the lessee
had only possession and a contingent future right of purchase, the effect
of section 20(b)(i), if applicable, would be to vest in the trustee greater
property rights than those held by the lessee. Alternatively, it was argued
that section 20(b)(i) was in conflict with the distributional scheme in BIA,
section 136, which expressly makes unsecured creditor claims “subject to
the rights of secured creditors.”
The Supreme Court rejected the first version of the lessor’s argument
on the ground that the BIA does not itself define property, but depends
on provincial law to prescribe the nature and content of property rights.
PPSA, section 20(b)(i) is part of the relevant provincial law and it qualifies
the lessor’s property rights relative to a trustee in bankruptcy by making
them contingent on perfection (registration). It is true that, in doing so, the
provision departs from the principle that a trustee in bankruptcy cannot
obtain larger property rights than those held by the bankrupt, but PPSA,
section 20(b)(i) modifies that principle. In doing so, it does not conflict with
the BIA because the BIA itself imports the provision as part of provincial
property law. The court’s response to the second version of the conflict
argument was similar. It is true that, according to BIA, section 136(1),
unsecured creditors’ claims are subject to the interests of secured creditors.
But the BIA depends on provincial law to give content to secured creditors’
interests, and PPSA section 20(b)(i) is part of the relevant provincial law.
OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Limited24 concerned the application of
the corresponding provisions in the Australian PPSA. Australian PPSA,
section 12(2)(i) provides that “security interest” includes an interest in
personal property under a lease of goods if the transaction in substance
secures payment or performance of an obligation. Section 12(3)(c)
provides that a security interest also includes the interest of a lessor
or bailor of goods under a PPS lease, whether or not the transaction in
substance secures payment or performance of an obligation. “PPS lease”
is defined in section 13 to mean a lease or bailment of goods for a term
of more than two years.25 Section 267 provides, in effect, that a security
23.
24.
25.

BIA, supra note 16.
[2017] NSWSC 21 [OneSteel].
The period was originally one year, as in the Canadian PPSAs, but, in response to industry
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interest which is unperfected at the commencement of the debtor’s (or
“grantor’s,” to use the Australian terminology) insolvency proceedings
vests in the insolvency estate. OneSteel concerned the lease of mining
equipment for a six-year term. The transaction was clearly a PPS lease
and the lessor registered a financing statement. However, the financing
statement misidentified the grantor (lessee) and, as a result the registration
was invalid.26 The grantor later went into administration and a dispute
arose between the administrator and the lessee over the leased equipment.
The administrator argued that since the lessor’s security interest was
unperfected at the commencement of the administration, the interest
vested in the estate pursuant to section 267.
Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution gives the
Commonwealth power to acquire property on just terms.27 Australian
PPSA, section 252B makes a provision of the statute inapplicable if its
operation would result in the “acquisition of property” otherwise than “on
just terms” in the section 51(xxxi) sense. The lessor argued that Australian
PPSA, section 267 was inapplicable because it resulted in confiscation of
the lessor’s ownership rights in the disputed equipment. The court rejected
the argument, holding that section 267 does not affect “an acquisition” at
all. Rather, the provision goes to the nature and extent of the rights the
secured party holds in the first place. In other words, the correct way of
viewing the application of the provision is not that it detracts from rights
the secured party held prior to the insolvency event but, rather, that it
qualifies the secured party’s initial entitlement.28 This is essentially the
same as the reasoning in Re Giffen. It is true that the contexts are different:
in Re Giffen, the focus was on the interaction between provincial and
representations, it was extended to two years by the Personal Property Securities (PPS Leases) Act
(Cth), 2017/39. The definition extends to transactions which are in substance or potentially for a
term of more than two years, including a lease or bailment which is for a term of up to two years but
which is automatically renewable, and a lease or bailment for a term of up to two years where the
lessee or bailee remains in possession after the expiration of the formal term. The definition excludes
transactions where the lessor or bailor is not in the business of leasing or bailing goods. It also excludes
bailments where the bailee provides no value: see Duggan, supra note 14 at paras 3.34-3.40.
26. Australian PPSA, supra note 4 at ss 164-165.
27. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1990.
28. The court gave two additional reasons in support of its conclusion. First, relying on earlier
authorities, it held that the scope of section 51(xxxi) is limited to acquisitions for any purpose in
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws. “Where a law provides for the acquisition of
property, not by the Commonwealth or one of its emanations, but by an independent third party, the
acquisition is unlikely to be for [a purpose] of one of the Commonwealth powers, but rather for the
private purposes of the third party” (at para 50). Second and relatedly, the court said, “a law which is
not directed towards the acquisition of property as such but which is concerned with the adjustment
of competing entitlements is unlikely to be characterized as ‘a law with respect to the acquisition of
property’” (at para 53).
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federal laws (the British Columbia PPSA, section 20(1)(b) and the federal
bankruptcy legislation), while in OneSteel, it was on the constitutional
validity of PPSA, section 267 as an exercise of federal law-making power.
However, the underlying issue was the same in both cases, as was the
court’s response.
Both cases are consistent with the PPSA basic substance over form
approach. Although in form a finance lease provides for the retention of
ownership in the lessor, in substance it is a security agreement and so the
lessor’s interest should have the same status in the lessee’s insolvency
proceedings as any other security interest. A true lease is, by definition, not
an in substance security agreement, but if it is a lease for a term of more
than one year (Canada and New Zealand) or a PPS lease (Australia), the
lessor is deemed for the purposes of the statute to hold a security interest.
The necessary implication is that the lessor is presumed to have transferred
ownership and to have taken back or reserved a security interest to secure
the lessee’s obligations under the lease. The legislature’s clear intention
is that the statute should apply on the same footing to a deemed security
interest as it does to an in-substance security interest. This point was not
addressed directly in either Re Giffen or OneSteel, but it is supported by
academic opinion in Canada which courts have accepted in New Zealand
and Australia.29
Graham v. Portacom New Zealand Ltd,30 a New Zealand case,
concerned the supply of five portable buildings pursuant to a lease which
was for a term of more than one year. The lessor did not perfect its “security
interest.” The lessee later gave a bank a security interest in all its present
and after-acquired personal property and the bank registered a financing
statement. The bank eventually appointed a receiver and a dispute arose
over the receiver’s right to sell the buildings. The receiver argued that the
bank had priority because the lessor’s security interest was unperfected.
The lessor argued that the bank’s security interest did not extend to the
buildings because the PPSA requirements for attachment had not been met.
One of the requirements for attachment is that the debtor must have rights
in the collateral.31 This is basic, because otherwise the security interest will
have no subject matter (nemo dat quod non habet). In the present case, the
lessor owned the buildings while the lessee had only a right of possession
and the bank’s security interest was correspondingly bounded.

29.
30.
31.

Bridge et al, supra note 7 at 602-603.
[2004] 2 NZLR 528, [2004] BCL 383 [Graham v Portacom].
New Zealand PPSA, supra note 3, s 40(1)(b); Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 13(1)(b).

12 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The court rejected the argument, holding that the lessee’s rights were
not limited to possession and that, “as against the lessee’s secured creditors,
the lessee has rights of ownership in the goods sufficient to permit a secured
creditor to acquire rights in priority to those of the lessor.”32 Then, quoting
from a well-known Canadian article, the court went on to say: “ostensible
ownership…has effectively replaced derivative title for the purpose of
determining the scope of the secured debtor’s estate at the priority level.
Thus, by the very act of deeming a true lease to be a PPSA security interest,
ownership in the leased assets is effectively vested in the lessee as against
the lessee’s secured creditors and trustee in bankruptcy.”33
Re Giffen suggests that the lessee’s possession is sufficient for a
competing security interest to attach to the goods. But Graham v Portacom
suggests an alternative conceptual basis for attachment, namely the lessee’s
deemed ownership. Graham v Portacom was followed in the Australian
case, Maiden Civil (P&E) Pty Ltd; Albarran v Queensland Excavation
Services Pty Ltd,34 where the court, after quoting extensively from the
New Zealand judgment, remarked that the Australian Parliament, “in
enacting legislation that was modelled on the New Zealand and Canadian
legislation, should be taken to have intended the same approach.”35
III. Some consequential issues
1. Introduction
The PPSAs subtract from a lessor’s ownership rights by deeming the
lessor to hold simply a security interest and subjecting it to the statutory
perfection requirements and priority rules. Re Giffen in Canada and
OneSteel in Australia confirm that there is no unjustified taking involved,
in effect, because the PPSAs are part of the very law of property which
defines the lessor’s entitlement in the first place. The cases focus on the
nature and extent of the lessor’s interest. Graham v Portacom in New
Zealand, and Maiden Civil in Australia, focus on the nature of the lessee’s
interest, confirming that if the lessor is deemed to hold only a security
interest then, as a corollary, the lessee must be deemed to have ownership.
As both cases demonstrate, the point is important in the application of
the PPSA attachment rules but at least in Canada, not much attention has
been given to its implications in other PPSA contexts. In particular, as
discussed below in Part III.2, the PPSAs require a secured party to amend
32. Graham v Portacom, supra note 30 at 28 [emphasis added].
33. Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added]. For another New Zealand case to the same effect, see Waller v
New Zealand Bloodstock Ltd, [2005] NZCA 254.
34. [2013] NSWSC 852 [Maiden Civil].
35. Ibid at para 32.
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its registration if the debtor transfers the collateral. These provisions raise
characterization issues in connection with their application to leases: (1)
are the provisions limited to transfers of ownership or do they apply also
to the transfer of lesser interests; (2) are the provisions limited to actual
transfers, or do they apply to deemed transfers as well; and (3) is a transfer
of possession sufficient for the provisions to apply?
In a similar vein, all the PPSAs provide that an unperfected security
interest is ineffective against (or subordinate to) a transferee of the
collateral. How do these provisions apply to a true lease which is for a
term of more than one year: is the lease deemed to be a sale so that the
lessee’s rights are determined as if she were a buyer, or are the deeming
provisions suspended in this context? More or less the same question
arises in connection with the “transactions in ordinary course” provision,
which states that, in certain circumstances, a buyer or lessee of goods takes
free of a security interest, even if it is perfected. In the case of a lease for
a term of more than one year, do the provisions apply on the basis that the
lessee is a deemed buyer or is it the lessee’s actual status that governs?
These questions are explored in the following discussion.
2. Registration amendment following transfer of collateral
The PPSAs all provide for the case where a security interest is perfected
by registration against the debtor’s name or other details and the debtor
transfers her interest in the collateral in circumstances where the security
interest continues following the transfer. There is a threat to the integrity
of the register in cases like this because a registry searcher dealing with
the transferee will probably conduct its search against the transferee’s
details but, since the security interest is registered against the transferor’s
details, the search will not disclose the registration. To reduce the risk, the
PPSAs require the secured party to amend its registration by adding or
substituting the transferee’s details: see, for example, Nova Scotia PPSA,
section 52(1).36
Section 52(1) clearly applies where the debtor sells the collateral
outright. However, in the absence of a statutory definition, the meaning
of “transfer” is less clear in transactions other than outright sales. Take
first the case of a conditional sale agreement, where the seller (secured

36. The corresponding provision in Australian PPSA, supra note 4, s 34 applies regardless of
whether the security interest is perfected by registration or some other method. The basic scheme in all
jurisdictions is that the secured party must amend its registration within a certain period after the date
of the transfer or the date it learns about the transfer, otherwise the security interest becomes wholly
or partly unperfected (the details vary as between Ontario, the other provincial jurisdictions and New
Zealand and Australia).
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party) reserves title in the goods to secure payment of the purchase
price. It could be argued that such a transaction is not a “transfer” for the
purposes of s. 52(1), at least until property passes to the buyer at the end
of the payment period. However, this overlooks the substance over form
philosophy which underpins the PPSAs; the statutes are drafted on the
assumption that a conditional sale agreement is in substance an outright
sale on credit terms with a security interest reserved in the collateral to
secure payment. In other words, the transaction is a deemed sale and
s. 52(1) should apply on that basis.37 The analysis should be the same if
the transaction takes the form of a security lease (finance lease), because a
security lease is in substance the same as a conditional sale agreement.38 In
both cases, the transaction in substance involves a partial transfer resulting
in the transferor and the transferee both holding interests in the collateral.
It follows that to comply with the registration amendment provision, the
secured party should amend its registration by identifying the transferee as
an additional debtor.39
On the other hand, for s. 52(1) to apply, there must be a transfer of “the
debtor’s interest” in the collateral. A true lease for a term of one year or
less is not a transfer to which s. 52(1) applies because the debtor transfers
only possession and the physical transfer of possession without more is
not sufficient to attract the application of the provision.40 This must be true
because otherwise all bailments would be subject to s. 52(1), for example,
storage, transportation and repair agreements, and that can hardly have
been the intention. Does the same analysis apply where the transaction is
a true lease for a term of more than one year? The PPSA scope provisions
imply that a true lease for a term of more than one year is to be treated,
for the purposes of the statute, on the same footing as a conditional sale
agreement and a finance lease; in other words, the lessor is deemed to
have sold the goods to the lessee and to have taken a security interest in
the goods to secure the lessee’s obligations. In other words, the lease is
presumptively a sale and so it is a transfer as defined.
Stockco Ltd v Gibson and Stiassny41 supports this view. The facts of
the case were that Stockco leased a herd of heifers to Nugen as part of a
sale and leaseback transaction. At all relevant times, the herd remained
37. Ziegel, Denomme & Duggan, supra note 1 at para 48.2.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. See the definition of “debtor” in Nova Scotia PPSA, section 2(1), which includes a
transferee from or a successor in title to the original debtor. There is a corresponding provision in all
the other PPSAs.
40. Ibid.
41. Stocko, supra note 36.
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on land owned by a group of companies which the court referred to as the
‘Security Group.’ Nugen subsequently entered into a bailment agreement
with the Security Group which allowed Nugen to graze the cattle on the
Security Group’s land for a period of 21 months. One of the issues was
whether Nugen had “transferred” the heifers to the Security Group so that
New Zealand PPSA, s. 88 (Nova Scotia PPSA, s. 52(1)) applied. The court
held that: (1) a lease for a term of more than one year is a “transfer” for the
purposes of s. 88; (2) the bailment was not a lease for a term of more than
one year as defined in subsection 16(1) because Nugen was not regularly
engaged in the business of bailing cattle, as the definition requires; and
(3) therefore, s. 88 did not apply. These conclusions are obiter, but they
clearly suggest that a lease for a term of more than one year (or a PPS lease
in the Australian context) is a “transfer” even though the lease does not
in substance secure payment or performance of an obligation. They also
confirm the conclusion suggested above that “transfer” does not include a
true lease which is for a term of one year or less (as defined). The decision
in Stocko is consistent with the overall scheme of the legislation and with
the policy of avoiding litigation on the true lease-finance lease distinction.
The meaning of “transfer” in the context of the equivalent provision in
Australian PPSA s. 34 was explored in considerable detail in the Whittaker
Review.42 The Review’s conclusions are in line with the Stockco case.
All the PPSAs except Ontario have a rule for determining priorities
between competing security interests given by different debtors (the
“double debtor priority provision”). The issue arises where the debtor
transfers an interest in collateral subject to a perfected security interest
and the transferee creates another security interest in favour of a second
secured party.43 In the fact situation to which the provision applies, the
first secured party’s security interest will become unperfected if it fails to
comply in time with the requirement to amend its registration following
the transfer. The double-debtor priority rule presupposes either that the
first secured party has amended its registration to substitute the transferee
as the new debtor or, alternatively, that the secured party’s grace period
under the registration amendment provision has not expired. In any event,
there is a clear connection between the registration amendment provision

42. Bruce Whittaker, Review of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009: Final Report
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2015), Annexure C [“Whittaker Report”].
43. See e.g. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 36(8). The provision is not comprehensive. It only
applies where the transferee-created security interest was granted before the transfer and, subject
to some exceptions, it gives priority to the transferor-created security interest: for discussion, see
Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 434-437.
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and the double debtor provision, and it follows that “transfer” should have
the same meaning in both contexts.
3. Transferee of collateral versus unperfected security interest
The Canadian PPSAs provide that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the interest of a transferee of the collateral who gives
value and has no knowledge of the security interest at the time of the
transfer.44 The provision clearly applies where the transaction between
the debtor and the transferee is an outright sale. By extension, it should
also apply where the transaction is a conditional sale agreement, given
the statute’s substance over form philosophy. In the case of a conditional
sale agreement, the transfer of ownership is delayed and it could be argued
that the provision does not apply if the security interest becomes perfected
between the date of the transaction and the date of the ownership transfer.
On the other hand, typically the transferee will have obtained possession
of the collateral, along with a contingent right of ownership, on or around
the date of the transaction and so the provision should apply on that
basis. Otherwise, the transferee would be forced to conduct two register
searches: one in advance of the transaction and the second before property
passes.45 Another way of reaching the same conclusion would be to say
that, for the purposes of the statute, the transaction is deemed to be an
outright sale coupled with the secured party having taken or reserved a
security interest to secure payment of the price. On that basis, ownership
is notionally transferred at the date of the transaction and, if the security
interest is unperfected at that point, the provision applies.46
A related issue is whether the provision applies to a conditional sale
agreement if the security interest becomes perfected after the date of
the transaction but before all the payments have been made. The statute
44. See e.g. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 21(3). The Ontario PPSA provision has an additional
limitation, not found elsewhere, that the transferee must have taken delivery of the collateral. The
corresponding provision in Australian PPSA, section 43(1) is simpler: “a buyer or lessee of personal
property, for value, takes the personal property free of an unperfected security interest.” New Zealand
PPSA, section 52 is similar. The Saskatchewan PPSA was amended in 2020 to bring its version of the
provision into line with Australia and New Zealand: Saskatchewan Personal Property and Securities
Act, 1993, SS 1993, c P-6.2, s 20(3) [Saskatchewan PPSA].
45. See Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 379-380. This conclusion would be consistent with
the generally accepted view that a conditional sale purchaser is a “buyer” in the context of the buyer
in ordinary course provision: see Part III.4, below.
46. The provision does not apply if the transaction between the debtor and the transferee is a security
agreement. But this limitation refers to cases where the transferee is the secured party (as where the
transaction takes the form of a mortgage), not the transferor: Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at
381. Compare with the Australian PPSA, section 42, which makes the point explicitly: “[s. 43(1) and
following provisions do] not apply to the acquisition of an interest in personal property…that is itself
a security interest.”
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defines “value” to mean any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract.47 On that basis, the transferee’s promise of payment is value and
if the security interest is unperfected at the date of the promise, the section
applies.48
It has been argued that the provision also applies where the transaction
is a lease, but with different consequences. In the case of a sale, the effect
of the provision is that the transferee obtains ownership of the collateral
free of the security interest; whereas in the case of a lease, the transferee
obtains possession and use of the collateral free of the security interest, but
the security interest continues in the debtor-lessor’s reversionary interest
and may be asserted against the debtor-lessor when the lease ends.49 This
statement presupposes a true lease agreement. It does not apply to a finance
lease because a finance lease is in substance a conditional sale agreement
and so it should be treated on the same footing.
The same might be said of a (true) lease that is for a term of more than
one year, given that, for the purposes of the statute, the lessor is deemed to
have sold the goods and retained a security interest to secure payment of
the lessee’s obligation. But the sale is only a deemed or notional one and it
does not confer actual ownership on the lessee. If the provision applied on
the basis that the lessee actually owned the goods, it would give the lessee
a windfall; the lessee only ever bargained for possession and use of the
goods for the term of the lease and it never expected to become the owner.
The provision states that the unperfected security interest is subordinate to
“the interest of a transferee.” In the context of a lease for a term of more
than one year, these words should be read as signifying that the lessee
takes its rights under the lease free of the security interest, but the security
interest continues in the lessor’s reversionary interest. In other words, the
provision applies in the same way to all true leases, whether or not they are
for a term of more than one year.
One implication of this analysis is that references in the statute to a
“transfer” do not always mean the same thing. A transfer of possession
alone may be sufficient to attract the application of Nova Scotia PPSA,
47. See e.g. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 2(1).
48. See Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 378-379. Contrast Royal Bank of Canada v Dawson
Motors (Guelph) Ltd (1981), 15 BLR 83, 1981 CarswellOnt 210 (Ont Co Ct), discussed in Ziegel,
Denomme & Duggan, supra note 1 at para 20.2.6.2. The same issue might arise if the transferee
acquires actual knowledge of the security interest before completing the payments. The appropriate
response in cases like this is not to deny the transferee clear title, but instead to allow them to complete
the transaction by making the balance of the payments to the secured party: ibid. Nova Scotia PPSA,
supra note 8, s 29(1)(b) and its counterparts in the other PPSAs is relevant in this connection (a
security interest extends to the proceeds of any dealing with the collateral).
49. Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 377.
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section 21(3) and its equivalents elsewhere, whereas in other contexts
the transfer must involve something more. A second implication is that
in applying section 21(3) and its equivalents to leases, the courts may be
called upon to determine whether the transaction is a true lease or an insubstance security agreement and the considerations identified in Part I,
above, will be relevant in this connection. This conclusion runs counter to
the generally received wisdom, which is that “a characterization problem
involving leases for a term of more than one year can arise only in the
context of Part V [the enforcement provisions].”50
4. The transactions in ordinary course provision
Nova Scotia PPSA, section 31(2) provides that a buyer or lessee of goods
sold in the ordinary course of business of the seller or lessor takes free of
any perfected or unperfected security interest unless the buyer or lessee
knows that the transaction is in breach of the security agreement (the
“transactions in ordinary course provision”). There is a corresponding
provision in all the other PPSAs, though in Ontario buyers and lessees
are provided for separately, in section 28(1) and (2) respectively. The two
Ontario provisions are in parallel terms, except that subsection (1) refers to
the buyer taking the goods free of a security interest, while subsection (2)
refers to the lessee holding the goods, “to the extent of the lessee’s rights
under the lease,” free of the security interest. The main purpose of the
provisions is to protect retail purchasers against restrictions in the security
agreement on the debtor-seller’s (lessor’s) freedom to deal with the goods
which may be hard to discover without conducting a PPS register search
and making follow-up inquiries.
In Royal Bank of Canada v 216200 Alberta Ltd,51 an inventory
financer seized goods from a retailer, including items that were on order
from various customers. At the time of the seizure, the items had not been
appropriated to the individual orders so that property in them had not
passed to the customers in accordance with the sale of goods legislation.52
The court held that the customers could not rely on the transactions in
ordinary course provision because until the passing of property there
was no sale, but only an agreement to sell, and it made no difference that
the customer may have pre-paid some or all of the purchase price.53 The
50. Cuming, supra note 7 at 260-261. See also: Burke, supra note 7 at 300 (“only if default occurs
under a lease will the characterisation of the lease possibly be relevant for relevant purposes of Part V
of the OPPSA”); Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 155; Ziegel, Denomme & Duggan, supra
note 1 at para 2.5.
51. (1986), 33 DLR (4th) 80, 1986 CarswellSask 264 (Sask CA).
52. Sale of Goods Act, RSS 1978, c S-1, ss 19-20.
53. For a fuller account, see Ziegel, Denomme & Duggan, supra note 1 at para 28.2.2.3; Cuming,
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decision was hard on the prepaying customers, but it is generally accepted
as correct; the proper approach to protecting pre-paying buyers in these
situations is via amendments to the passing of property rules in the sale of
goods legislation, not by expansively interpreting the PPSA.54
The decision in the Royal Bank case suggests that the transactions in
ordinary course provision may not apply if the transaction is a conditional
sale, where property is reserved in the seller until the buyer has paid all
the instalments, because until property passes there is no sale. But that
would run counter to the PPSA’s substance over form philosophy: as a
matter of substance, there is no difference between the case where the
customer finances the transaction on conditional sale terms and the case
where the customer buys the goods outright with loan finance obtained
from a third-party source. Spittlehouse v Northshore Marine Inc (Receiver
of)55 concerned a contract for the construction and supply of a yacht on
reservation of title terms. The buyer had paid around ninety per cent of
the price when the yacht was seized by a financer holding a perfected
security interest in the yacht builder’s inventory. The question was whether
OPPSA, s. 28(1) applied, given that property in the yacht had not passed to
the buyer. The Ontario Court of Appeal refused to follow the Royal Bank
case, holding that: (1) the provision should be read as applying to sales in
a non-technical sense; and (2) on that basis it was immaterial that property
had not passed to the buyer before the yacht was seized. The problem with
Spittlehouse is that, while it reached the right result on the facts, it is at
odds with the Royal Bank case which, as noted above, was also correctly
decided.
The court in Spittlehouse might have reached the same result without
contradicting the Royal Bank case if it had taken a substance over form
approach. This would have involved recognizing that, for PPSA purposes,
a conditional sale is in substance an outright sale under which property
passes immediately to the buyer with the seller taking or reserving a
security interest to secure payment of the price.56 The courts themselves
Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at 387-388.
54. I.e., the problem requires a comprehensive response, not a piecemeal one. For example, it does
the customer no good to have the protection of the PPSA transactions in ordinary course provision
if the sale of goods rules on the passing of property continue to apply in the bankruptcy context: see
Ziegel, Denomme & Duggan, supra note 1 at para 28.2.2.3; Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 1 at
389-390; Ronald CC Cuming, “A Facelift for the Saskatchewan (and Other) PPS Acts” (2020) 63 Can
Bus LJ at 36-37.
55. (1994) 18 OR (3d) 60, 114 DLR (4th) 500 [Spittlehouse].
56. See Jacob S Ziegel, “To What Types of Sale Does Section 28(1) of the OPPSA Apply?” (1995)
24 Can Business LJ 457. Compare UCC § 2-401 (2002): “[a]ny retention or reservation by the seller
of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of
a security interest.”
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might have arrived at that solution eventually, but the Ontario legislature
decided not to leave matters to chance. The Ontario PPSA was amended
in 2006 by the addition of subsections 28(1.1)–(1.3).57 These provisions
are designed to make it clear that subsection (1): (1) applies whether or
not property in the goods has passed to the buyer; but (2) does not apply
unless the goods have been ‘identified’ to the contract. The provisions
effect a statutory reconciliation of the Royal Bank and Spittlehouse cases:
in a Royal Bank scenario, subsection 28(1) would not apply because the
disputed goods were not identified; while in a Spittlehouse scenario,
subsection (1) would apply because, even though property had not passed,
the goods were identified.
Saskatchewan enacted comparable reforms in 2020 when parallel
amendments were made to the PPSA and Sale of Goods Act stating,
in effect, that: (1) a buyer who has paid all or substantially all of the
contract price, acquires an equitable interest in the goods immediately
on the seller acquiring the goods; and (2) a retention of title provision
in the sale agreement does not affect the outcome.58 The results are that
in a Spittlehouse scenario, the buyer has the protection of the PPSA
transactions in ordinary course provision and, provided they have pre-paid
“all or substantially all of the contract price,” protection also in the debtor’s
bankruptcy.59 In December 2020, the Alberta Law Reform Institute released
a report for discussion on personal property security law reform.60 The
report recommends addressing the Spittlehouse issue by the addition of a
new subsection (1.1) to the Alberta PPSA, section 30 (the transactions in
ordinary course provision),61 stating that: “any retention of or reservation
by the seller of title or property in goods that are delivered to the buyer
is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.”62 The provision
is based on section 2-401 of the United States Uniform Commercial
Code.63 In summary, as a result of the above reforms, the Ontario and
Saskatchewan transactions in ordinary course provision extends to buyers
under conditional sale agreements and the same is prospectively true in
57. And also subsubsections 28(2.1)–(2.3), which are parallel provisions applicable to the lessee
in ordinary course provision (subsection 28(2)). The amendments were recommended in the CBAO
Submission 1998, supra note 14 at 14-16.
58. Saskatchewan PPSA, supra note 3, s 30(2.1)-(2.2); Sale of Goods Act, supra note 52, s 20, rule
V, (1.1)-(1.2).
59. See Cuming, supra note 54 at 37-38.
60. Alberta Law Reform Institute, Personal Property Security Law: Report for Discussion, 35
(2020) [“ALRI Report”].
61. Personal Property Security Act, RSA 2000, c P-7, s 30.
62. “ALRI Report,” supra note 60 at paras 125-128 (including Recommendation 16).
63. Supra note 57.
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Alberta. In provinces which have not enacted corresponding reforms, the
outcome depends on the willingness of the courts to treat conditional sale
agreements on a substance over form basis.
The effect of the transactions in ordinary course provision in its
application to conditional sale agreements is that the buyer takes their
interest in the goods free of the security interest. The buyer’s interest
comprises a right of possession and a right of ownership contingent on
completing the payments. The transactions in ordinary course provision
prevents the secured party from interfering with the buyer’s possession
during the currency of the agreement and it gives the buyer title free of the
security interest when property passes.64
As indicated earlier, Ontario PPSA, section 28 provides separately for
sales and leases in subsections (1) and (2) respectively. This approach has
the benefit of making it clear that “taking free of the security interest”
means different things in the two contexts. But the statute does not address
the question as to which subsection applies in the case of a finance lease.
In principle, the answer should be that subsection (1) applies, because a
finance lease is in substance the same as a conditional sale agreement.
In the absence of the 2006 amendments, this would have been an easy
enough conclusion to reach. But the amendments muddy the waters by at
least suggesting that the deemed sale argument may not apply (because
if it did, the amendments would not have been necessary). On the other
hand, the point may not particularly matter. Section 28(2) refers to the
lessor holding the goods free of any security interest “to the extent of the
lessor’s rights under the lease.” In the case of a finance lease, the lessee
has a right of possession coupled with a least de facto right of ownership
contingent on completing the payments and, on this basis, subsections (1)
and (2) produce the same result.
The analysis is simpler in the case of a true lease, where subsection
(2) clearly applies. The result is that the lessee holds free of the security
interest, but only to the extent of its possessory rights under the lease.
The provision does not affect the secured party’s claim to the lessor’s
reversionary interest and so it may assert its security interest against the
lessor once the lease comes to an end. In the other provinces, and also in
Australia and New Zealand, the transactions in ordinary course provision
do not separate out sales and leases, but says simply that a “buyer or
lessee” takes the goods free of any security interest. On the other hand, it
64. But the security interest extends to the buyer’s payments as proceeds of the original collateral,
and so the secured party can claim the payments from the debtor-seller assuming they remain traceable:
see e.g. Nova Scotia PPSA, supra note 8, s 29(1)(b).
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is clear by implication that the provisions apply to leases in the same way
as the Ontario version.65
The position should be the same regardless of whether the lease is
for a term of more than one year. It is true that if the lease is for a term of
more than one year, the lessor is deemed for the purposes of the statute to
hold a security interest and, by implication, the lessee is deemed to have
acquired ownership. But, as with Nova Scotia PPSA, section 21(3) and its
equivalents elsewhere, the transactions in ordinary course provision could
only work on that basis by giving the lessee actual ownership free of the
security interest, which would be a windfall. In summary, the transactions
in ordinary course provision applies to a finance lease on the same basis
that it applies to a conditional sale, but it applies differently to a true lease,
even if the term is more than one year. This is another context, then, apart
from the PPSA enforcement provisions, where the true lease-finance lease
distinction continues to matter.
Conclusion
The influence of the Canadian PPSAs has spread internationally over the
past decade or so, with various countries, including New Zealand and
Australia, relying heavily on the Canadian model to reform their own
secured transactions laws. These importing countries have benefited in
the process because reliance on a tried and tested model avoids the costs
of reinventing the wheel and it enables courts and commentators in the
importing country to key into the exporting country’s learning. As this
article has demonstrated, Australian and New Zealand courts have relied
to a considerable extent on Canadian case law and literature in developing
their own jurisprudence, but in the process they are giving back by offering
their own perspective on issues that have not received as much attention
in Canada.
The article’s focus is on the application of the statute to lease
agreements. In Canada, the non-Ontario provinces took the initiative of
collapsing the true lease-finance lease distinction in their PPSAs, for the
purposes both of avoiding litigation on the question and addressing the
ostensible ownership problem which is common to both kinds of lease and
Ontario eventually moved to this model as well. The New Zealand and
Australian PPSAs both followed suit, but their courts and commentators
have brought to light some features of the measure which have not been
systematically explored in Canada. These include, as discussed above, the
implications of the deemed security interest provisions in contexts outside
65.
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PPSA, Part V (enforcement of security interests), namely, the provisions
governing: registration amendments following the transfer of collateral;
priorities between competing security interests given by different debtors;
the priority status of an unperfected security interest relative to a transferee
of the collateral; and the rights of a buyer or lessee of collateral sold or leased
in the ordinary course of business. The conventional wisdom in Canada is
that the true lease-finance lease distinction has been successfully confined
to enforcement issues, but the New Zealand and Australian contributions
indicate that the distinction remains relevant in quite a number of other
contexts as well. It is true that there has been no litigation to date on the
issue in these other contexts, but the prospect is clearly there. The bottom
line is that while collapsing the true lease-finance lease distinction for
PPSA purposes has doubtlessly reduced both litigation and information
costs, the cost savings at least on the litigation front may be somewhat less
than was originally supposed.
The discussion in this article has focused on cases where there are
only two relevant dealings: the security agreement and the lease. But in
Australia, a good deal of attention has also been given to the more difficult
issues that arise where there are three or more transactions involved: for
example, where a secured party holds a security interest in goods which the
debtor subsequently leases to a lessee who in turn either becomes bankrupt
or consensually transfers, sub-leases or gives a security interest in the
goods to a fourth party.66 To date, this issue has barely been addressed in
the Canadian case law and literature.67 But it is bound to surface at some
point. When it does, Canadian courts and commentators will no doubt
draw on the Australian contributions, in a further manifestation of the
international knowledge-sharing that the spread of the PPSAs has made
possible.

66. See “Whittaker Report,” supra note 42, Annexure C; Craig Wappett & Anthony Duggan,
“Rights in Collateral Under the PPSA: Rebutting the Minimalist Approach” (2019) 30 J Banking &
Finance L & Practice 151; Diccon Loxton, Sheelagh McCracken & Andrew Boxall, “PPSA Models:
A Minimalist Approach” (2018) Commercial L Quarterly 3; Diccon Loxton, Sheelagh McCracken &
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Commercial L Quarterly 3; Diccon Loxton, Sheelagh McCracken & Andrew Boxall, “PPSA Models:
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-Tier Security Interests: A Continuing Case for Nemo Dat Under the Personal Property Securities Act
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